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THE NEAR FUTURE OF AIR CHARTER
REGULATION: THE CASE FOR MORE
EXPERIMENTATION IN PUBLIC POLICY
Jaap Kamp*
W HILE the air transport industry is adjusting to escalating
fuel prices and continuing inflation, its regulatory environ-
ment is undergoing changes that will have significant impact on air
transport in the near future. Both in the United States and overseas,
new charter concepts are being introduced that should replace the
traditional but problematical "prior affinity" concept. In this article
a case is made for controlled experimentation with relatively lib-
eral charter concepts. Regulators should, therefore, develop a legal
framework that provides adequate flexibility in times of changing
economic and marketing conditions.
In October 1974, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) intro-
duced minimum charter rate "guidelines" across the North Atlantic.
The guidelines constituted a significant reversal of the CAB charter
policy during the late sixties and early seventies. During that period
the CAB had sought to develop charter services and to limit "its
intervention in the rate regulation area so the public could be served
at prices settled in the competitive marketplace."' The guidelines
were challenged by the Department of Justice and others in court,
and finally vacated by the CAB on February 11, 1975. In this
article, the author argues that governments should refrain from
imposing minimum charter rates, not only on legal grounds, but
also on practical and economic considerations.
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this article is to review and analyze several re-
*L.L.M., 1969, Leiden University, The Netherlands; M.B.A., 1974, Indiana
University. The author owes particular thanks to the conversations with Dr. H. A.
Wassenbergh and K. Veenstra. Opinions and errors remain his own.
139 Fed. Reg. 43,575 (1974).
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cent changes in air charter regulation and to suggest some courses
of regulatory action for the future. The paper begins with a brief
discussion of some recent developments on the North Atlantic
route that have shaped the present regulatory climate for charters.
While there is a call for liberalized charter regulations, notably
within the United States, several governments and carriers want
to contain further growth of charter services and advocate the intro-
duction of minimal charter rates.
The second section of this article analyzes new charter concepts
such as the Advance Booking Charter, the Travel Group Charter,
and the One-stop Inclusive Tour Charter. These charter concepts
should be viewed as new products that deserve to be testmarketed
on a more liberal basis than the Civil Aeronautics Board has
allowed.
In the third part of the paper the disadvantages of minimum
charter rates are set forth on legal, economic, and practical grounds,
and a case is made for controlled experimentation with liberal char-
ter concepts. To enable such experimentation in international avi-
ation, governments and carriers should take a fresh approach to
the problem of protecting scheduled services. Governments should
begin with designating routes on which a minimum level of essen-
tial scheduled service has to be maintained (so-called ES-routes).
Scheduled carriers serving these ES-routes should receive limited
protection, preferably in the form of direct subsidies if ES-routes
are unprofitable. Excess traffic on ES-routes and traffic on non ES-
routes should have an opportunity to be carried by a wide variety
of services, ranging from supersonic scheduled services to charters
or a no-frills skybus. As long as scheduled or non-scheduled car-
riers view it as feasible to provide one or more services at a profit
they should be allowed to provide them, at least on an experimental
and temporary basis.
A. Recent Developments in Air Transport
During 1974, the North Atlantic route (here defined as the mar-
ket between the United States and Canada on the one side and
Western Europe on the other) was served by 29 scheduled carriers
and some 20 supplemental or charter-only carriers. The route is
generally considered the most competitive market in the interna-
tional airline industry because it is served by so many carriers which
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charge the lowest fares when compared to fares on other interna-
tional routes. The market is also thought of as one of the most in-
novative of the industry with service improvements, whether tech-
nologically induced or marketing oriented, often having been intro-
duced for the first time on this route.'
Since the mid-sixties, the North Atlantic market has been char-
acterized by a tremendous growth in transatlantic charter traffic. In
1965, the 470,000 charter passengers accounted for 12.8 percent
of all transatlantic passengers. Nearly one million charter passen-
gers were carried in 1968; over three million were carried during
1973.' Scheduled traffic has also grown in these years, although at
a slower rate than charter traffic. In 1965, 3,200,000 passengers
were carried on scheduled services; in 1973, the total was 8,544,-
000." By 1973, one out of every four passengers across the North
Atlantic was on a charter service. These numbers indicate a sub-
stantial increase in the charter versus scheduled competition.
During the seventies, it became apparent that heavy competition,
fuel price increases, inflationary pressures, and other circumstances
put a heavy burden on the industry, especially on the U.S. inter-
national scheduled carriers. Pan American World Airways and
Trans World Airlines incurred such heavy losses on their interna-
tional routes that they formally petitioned the Civil Aeronautics
Board under section 406 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958' for
temporary and final subsidy rates for their international operations.
Substantial fare increases (caused by the dollar devaluation, fuel
cost increases, and world-wide inflation) do not offset the increased
costs to carriers. The fare increases of more than twenty-five to
2 M. STRASZHEIM, THE INTERNATIONAL AIRLINE INDUSTRY 107 (1969).
' CAB, U.S. INTERNATIONAL PASSENGER MOVEMENTS ON CHARTER FLIGHTS,
1968-1973 (1974).
4 1d. at 30.
5 Between July, 1973 and September, 1974 the average cost per gallon on
North Atlantic operations increased from 13.7 to 37.0 cents per gallon. CAB,
Press Release 74-230 (Oct. 24, 1974).
"See also CAB Order No. 74-9-62, (1974) in which the Board dismissed
TWA's petition for temporary and final subsidy without prejudice. TWA's petition
did not contain information on the carrier's domestic operations and was deemed
to be deficient under section 406 of the Federal Aviation Act. Pan Am, according
to the Board, "has not established that it has such an immediate and critical need
for subsidy support as to warrant the establishment of a temporary subsidy rate."
Pan Am's petition for a final subsidy was assigned for hearing befcre an adminis-
trative law judge of the Board.
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forty percent between early 1973 and November, 1974 do raise
the question whether air transport is pricing itself out of the market,
especially for pleasure travel.
The changes in the industry's environment seem to bring the in-
dustry into a continuing state of shock. The new pressures that have
been put on the industry require an accelerated review of the U.S.
international aviation policy. For this purpose an interdepartmental
review committee headed by Robert H. Binder of the Department
of Transportation officially started the preparations for a new policy
in January, 1975. The subjects for review include the viability of
Bermuda principles and the ex post facto review of capacity offered,
the international rate making structure, the relationship between
charter and scheduled services, pooling, national interest routes,
and the government's method of bilateral negotiations.! Completion
of inter-agency review is expected soon, after which a revised Pres-
idential Statement on International Aviation Policy (similar to the
Statements of 1963 and 1970) may be at hand.
B. Charter Regulation Experiences Drastic Overhauling
During the seventies, the regulatory climate for charter services
is undergoing dramatic changes which may seriously determine the
future of this relatively new kind of service as well as its counter-
part, the scheduled service. A chronology of the most important
events related to charter regulations begins in 1972, with the intro-
duction of the Travel Group Charter (TGC) by the CAB.' Simul-
taneously, the member governments of the European Civil Aviation
Conference (ECAC) introduced the Advance Booking Charter
(ABC). Both ABC and TGC are similar concepts that are publicly
available (as opposed to affinity charters); both require reservations
and payments to be made more than 60 days before departure.
In June, 1973, the CAB authorized the member carriers of the
National Air Carrier Association (NACA) to engage in discussions
in an attempt to agree upon minimum rate levels on North Atlantic
routes." Later in 1973 this authorization was extended to all U.S.
IAVIATION WEEK, Feb. 24, 1974.
'37 Fed. Reg. 20,808 (1972); 39 Fed. Reg. 29,345 (1974); 14 C.F.R. § 372a
et seq.
'CAB Order 73-6-79 (June 19, 1973). CAB Orders 73-10-99 (Oct. 26, 1973),
74-5-89 (May 17, 1974) and 74-8-62 at 1, (Aug. 15, 1974) permitted these dis-
cussions to be continued.
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and foreign carriers providing North Atlantic charter services. Since
then the efforts of carriers to reach a unanimous agreement have
failed.1" In the fall of 1974, however, the CAB attempted to realize
what the carriers were unable and unwilling to do by themselves.
On October 18, the Board issued a Policy Statement establishing
general guidelines for suspension and investigation of trans-atlantic
charter tariffs, setting forth minimum levels below which tariffs
will be regarded as prima facie unreasonable, absent adequate eco-
nomic justification, and thus subject to suspension and investiga-
tion."
Shortly thereafter, the Board issued two closely related notices of
proposed rule making, one of which would authorize a new type of
charter-the one-stop inclusive tour charter (OTC) -and the other
which would terminate the existing "prior affinity" charter rules."
The two proposals evoked an unexpectedly large number of reac-
tions among interest groups and different segments of the public.
The proposal to terminate affinity charters was heavily criticized by
existing affinity organizations and their members, as well as by the
supplemental air carriers. These reactions forced the Board not to
"terminate the sale of affinity charters on March 31, 1975, as pre-
viously proposed, or anytime during the year 1975."" With this
decision the Board temporarily left undecided the future of affinity
charters.
During the winter months of 1974-1975, intensive discussions
were held among member airlines of the International Air Trans-
port Association (IATA). The discussions centered around the in-
troduction of a new transatlantic Advance Purchase Excursion fare
(APEX) and the level of IATA's 22-45 day excursion fares which
were generally supposed to be the fares most competitive with char-
ter tariffs. Late in January, 1975, IATA airlines adopted the APEX
fare to compete with charters, although its level is generally twenty
to thirty percent above charter fares." The APEX formula is com-
0 Wall Street Journal, Sept. 25, 1974, at 14, col. 2.
1139 Fed. Reg. 38092 (1974).
"Notice of Proposed Rule Making EDR-281, SPDR-38, ODR-9, Oct. 30,
1974 (One-stop Inclusive Tour Charter); Notice of Proposed Rule Making
EDR-237C, Oct. 30, 1974 (Termination of "Prior Affinity" Charter Authority).
'"40 Fed. Reg. 5371 (1975).
"Wall Street Journal, Jan. 28, 1975, at 4, col. -.
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parable with Travel Group or Advance Booking Charters (TGC/
ABC) in that reservations and payments for this fare must be made
more than sixty days before departure. If the passenger cancels, he
will be penalized with a no-refund charge of ten percent of the fare
or fifty dollars, whichever is higher.
A final development that should be mentioned briefly relates to
governmental activities at the bilateral level that deal with charter
services, charter landing rights, and the status of carriers that are
allowed to perform charter services. After the United States had
reached a rather innovative Memorandum of Understanding on
Civil Aviation Charter Services with Belgium in October, 1972,
the U.S. government concluded the first series of Nonscheduled Air
Service Agreements with Yugoslavia (September, 1973), Canada
(May, 1974), and Jordan (September, 1974)."5 These agreements
provided a whole new regime in the area of non-scheduled air serv-
ice and set forth in considerable detail the rights of the two coun-
tries with respect to charter services.
II. THE PROBLEM FOR THE REGULATOR: CREATING
NEW CHARTER CONCEPTS
The charter developments that have been referred to are fre-
quently interrelated with each other as they are often the result of
structural changes within the air transport industry. One of these
changes in the industry, at least on a route such as the North Atlan-
tic, is a shift in travel purposes by passengers. Immediate post-war
expectations on the North Atlantic reflected a major emphasis on
travel for business purposes." For governments and airlines this
emphasis was translated in the continued promotion and protection
of the scheduled system: carefully defined routes would be served
on a regular and frequent basis, generally available to a segment of
the public that was willing and able to put up the relatively high
prices for the services provided.
15 For the text and a discussion of United States-Belgium Memorandum of
Understanding, signed Oct. 17, 1972, see Robert M. Lichtman, Regularization of
the Legal Status of International Air Charter Services, 38 J. AIR L. & CoM. 441,
464-471 (1972). For the text of the Nonscheduled Air Service Agreements, see
Dept. of State Press Release 1973-352 (Yugoslavia, Sept. 27, 1973); 1974-177
(Canada, May 8, 1974); 1974-382 (Jordan, Sept. 27, 1974).
I Scoutt and Costello, Charters, The New Mode: Setting a New Course for
International Air Transportation, 39 J. AIR L. & COM. 1, 9-10 (1973).
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With the post-war rise in incomes, increased transnational com-
munication and integration, and the cost-saving opportunities of
aviation technology, a general trend has emerged in which passen-
gers traveling for non-business purposes clearly outweigh those
traveling for business purposes. Recreational travel (for vacations
or sightseeing) and travel to visit friends and relatives led to what
the CAB recently called the "irresistible and understandable public
demand for low-cost air transportation, much of it on charter serv-
i c e s .
,17
During the sixties and early seventies, the regulatory climate was
relatively favorable to the expansion of charter competition. Be-
tween 1963 and 1972, transatlantic authority had been granted to
twenty-three European charter carriers and six U.S. supplemental
carriers. In the Presidential Statement of International Air Trans-
portation Policy of the United States (1970) charter services were
further recognized, notwithstanding a proviso, to avoid a substan-
tial impairment of scheduled services. In an assessment of transat-
lantic charter competition during this period, the economist Lucile
Keyes states that "there is no doubt that there would have been far
stronger resistance to charter expansion . . ., if general economic
conditions had been less favorable and there had been an accom-
panying drop-off in scheduled traffic."18 Now that we have arrived at
a time in which general economic conditions are apparently un-
favorable, the question of whether charter services should be ex-
panded, and if so, to what extent, is more urgent than ever.
The regulator in the United States is confronted with the preser-
vation of an "air transportation system properly adapted to the
present and future needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of
the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national de-
17 One of the classic sentences with which the CAB introduced the Travel
Group Charter, 37 Fed. Reg. 20808 (1972). For the shift from business travel to
non-business travel, see generally CAB STAFF STUDY, AIR TRAVEL IN THE SEVEN-
TIES, THE ECONOMIC POTENTIAL (1972).
" Keyes, The Transatlantic Charter Policy of the United States, 39 J. AIR L.
& COM. 215, 244-45 (1973).
19 The economic climate for the airline industry is obviously not too rosy in
view of the fuel price increases, the adjustment problems of wide-body jets, eco-
nomic recession in the U.S., and a zero traffic growth. Despite these grave cir-
cumstances, this author maintains an optimistic view that fuel and wide-body
problems will be resolved, that the U.S. recession is temporary, and that traffic
growth will resume in the near future.
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fense."' This obligation does not refer to the preservation of a
"scheduled system" or of the "scheduled carriers."'Nor does it say
that charter services should be promoted or that the public should
receive air transportation at the lowest possible prices. What it does
imply is that the CAB should maintain a certain degree of air trans-
port service, even if the free market forces do not provide for it.
For this purpose the status of a "certificated carrier" has been cre-
ated; its entry in aviation is restricted and its competition is deliber-
ately reduced.
At the international level, the departure from open and free com-
petition is reinforced by such non-economic considerations as na-
tional defense, prestige, and uneconomic protection of national car-
riers in view of foreign competition. As is generally known, these
considerations are complex and contribute heavily to the politiciza-
tion of international air transport.'
To discuss the problems of charter regulation in this context is
a hazardous operation since the charter concept touches some of the
key principles in transportation and particularly in aviation. With
the historical emphasis on scheduled traffic and services, the prob-
lem of charters has been one of "containment" through both pri-
vate (IATA) and public regulation. As long as the charter concept
could be defined clearly and the de facto development of charters
did not run too much ahead of the de jure development, regulatory
problems could be kept to a minimum. During the last decade, how-
ever, charters have increased in popularity; simultaneously, the
original charter concept has been more or less eroded and become
practically synonymous with "low-cost air transportation."
For the moment, two questions seem highly pertinent to the status
quo and the future of air charter regulation. First, should new char-
ter concepts be designed, and, if so, to what extent should they be
liberalized or restricted in view of the potential impairment of
scheduled services? Secondly, in the area of charter rate making,
should governments or regulatory agencies encourage or discourage
20 Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 102, 72 Stat. as amended, 49 U.S.C. S
1302 (1970).
21 Several authors have treated these issues in detail, see, e.g., M. STRASZHEIM,
THE INTERNATIONAL AIRLINE INDUSTRY (1969); H. WASSENBERGH, ASPECTS OF
AIR LAW AND CIVIL AIR POLICY IN THE SEVENTIES (1970); W. O'CONNOR, EcO-
NOMIC REGULATION OF THE WORLD'S AIRLINES-A POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1971).
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cartellization among charter carriers and should they set minimum
rates for charter traffic?
The first question is presently under consideration of both Con-
gress and the Board; the second is of major concern to the CAB,
justice, state, and transportation departments, and a number of
ECAC governments. Preliminary answers to the questions can be
expected in the near future, assuming that the legislators' and regu-
lators' pace in decision-making is positively correlated with the im-
portance of the problems.
A. A New Charter Concept: The Travel Group Charter
The problems with affinity charters are well-known. In the words
of the CAB, the rules of such charters (1) "tend to discriminate
against members of the public who do not belong to qualified or-
ganizations with a membership large enough to successfully mount
a charter program" and (2) have "proven to be extremely difficult
to enforce."' The initial answer to the discrimination and enforce-
ment problems was the introduction of the advance booking con-
cept-in the form of the Travel Group Charter (TGC) in the Unit-
ed States and the Advanced Booking Charter (ABC) in the ECAC
countries.
The abolition of affinity requirements required a completely new
formula to distinguish charter services from scheduled services. Sup-
plemental carriers and governments have found a method for dis-
tinction in the advance booking principle although the legislative
history of charters does not reveal a direct basis for this principle.
In addition to the advance booking feature, the most significant dis-
tinction consists of the requirement that the TGC or ABC organizer
composes a group of at least forty passengers who shall leave and re-
turn on the same flights. The trip is to last a minimum of seven
days (ten days in some areas, e.g., transatlantic trips).
For the individual traveler the TGC or ABC is publicly available
via advertisements, travel agents, announcements in magazines, etc.
The publication of a series of departure dates even gives TGC's or
ABC's a flavor of regularity. Before one supposes that the advance
booking flights are fully comparable to scheduled services, how-
ever, one should read the whole TGC advertisement and the indi-
vidual passenger contract. The TGC fare depends on the number
237 Fed. Reg. 20808 (1972).
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
of participants that ultimately sign up (the advertised fare being
based on the sale of all seats and therefore the lowest possible). If
a TGC passenger cancels his trip, he is subjected to a complex sys-
tem of no-refund penalties and assignment possibilities. If the TGC
organizer does not succeed in the formation of a group of sufficient
size (minimum forty passengers) at least sixty days before depar-
ture, the flight must be canceled.
The first year of operation of TGC's and ABC's (1973) was a
complete failure. During that year, 235 TGC and 555 ABC flights
were flown, representing only three and three-tenths percent of all
international charter flights to or from the United States.' The CAB
realized that the poor 1973 experience of TGC's was mainly the
result of severe legal and marketing constraints on the industry
and the potential TGC travelers; to use the words of the CAB, 1973
TGC's were "virtually unmarketable."'" In August, 1974, the CAB
adopted a modified TGC regulation liberalizing several of the ear-
lier restrictions.' The deadline for filing the list of original partici-
pants by the organizer was reduced from ninety to sixty days prior
to the scheduled departure date. A TGC can now be filed when at
least ninety percent (previously one-hundred percent) of the con-
tracted seats have been sold to participants. Up to fifteen percent
of the original participants may assign their seats to the general
public without losing the prepaid fare (forbidden before the liberal-
ization).
Despite these relaxations, the TGC remains a curiosity in air
transport, as well as in marketing and legal construction. Its opera-
tional features as a new product are further complicated by the dif-
ferences between it and European originating ABC's. The TGC re-
striction that is most disturbing to operators is the pro rata aspect
of its price. TGC fares depend on the final number of participants.
Although minimum fares are advertised (assuming that the maxi-
mum number of participants will be obtained), the fine print in the
TGC announcement and the contract refer to a possible higher fare
(up to a maximum of twenty percent) "if not all seats are sold."
According to the Board, the TGC regime is constructed on the
23 Supra note 3, at 20.
2439 Fed. Reg. 29345 (1974).
I3 1d. at 1.
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basic premise that a group of individuals undertakes a joint obliga-
tion to charter an aircraft, accepting limited mutual risks of pro
rata price fluctuations."6 The TGC charterer is thus not an entre-
preneur who bears the risk of losses due to insufficient participation;
this risk bearing feature is reserved for the charter participants them-
selves. The approach taken by ECAC members is to offer ABC's
to the public at a fixed price, which involves the charterer as the
risk-taker for unsold seats. TGC's originating in Europe may be
marketed under this fixed price concept.' Needless to say, U.S. sup-
plemental carriers and charter operators will continue their efforts
to remove most of the TGC's artificial restrictions. The pro rata
pricing concept is a prime target not only because European ABC's
do not have this requirement but even more so because it is a high-
ly unrealistic proposition in today's mass marketing of consumer
products. Potential travelers, like most consumers, want to know
in advance what a product will cost." The few cases in which "ex
post" pricing takes place (e.g., car repairs) must have a very prac-
tical and compelling justification. Even then the pricing procedure
is not without problems. Nowhere do advertisements say: "Our
product will cost more if we sell less today!" Explanation of the pro
rata requirement combined with the complicated cancellation pro-
visions, for both the charter organizer and the TGC participant,
take up most of the TGC advertisement or announcement. The lat-
ter is more a form of "legal Spielerei" than the promotion of an
original or attractive product.
The TGC was adopted on an experimental basis expiring De-
cember 31, 1975. In a recent notice of proposed rule making, the
26 Id. at 5.
21 Canadian and U.S. authorities and representatives of the 20 member states
of ECAC worked out a "Declaration of Agreed Principles" on charter flights over
the North Atlantic in Ottawa, October 19-21, 1972. The Ottawa accord has been
the basis for bilateral Memoranda of Understanding in which each party accepts
as charterworthy transatlantic traffic originated in the territory of the other party
and organized and operated pursuant to the "advance charter" (TGC or ABC)
rules of that party. See, e.g., Dept. of State Press Release 1973-113 (Apr. 16,
1973). (Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Ger-
many.) For the text of the Ottawa Declaration of Agreed Principles, see 68
DEPT. OF STATE BULL. 20 (1973).
28 In a current consumer research study of attitudes toward charter travel the
author found that 90 percent of the respondents (passengers and visitors of travel
agencies in the Mid-West) consider it extremely or very important to them that
they know the exact fare when making reservations for a trip to Europe.
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CAB tentatively concluded to make the TGC a charter concept of
indefinite duration." The Board stated that TGC's can become a via-
ble form of charter transportation, particularly under the liberalized
rules of August, 1974. Since the diversionary impact of TGC's on
scheduled services has been nil, the CAB did not find it necessary
to consider the new concept further as an experiment. In its ex-
planatory statement, the CAB remains cautious, however, and
makes it clear that
if we ultimately determine in this proceeding to make the duration
of the TGC rule indefinite, we shall of course stand ready to adjust
our charter rules, including the TGC rule, in such a manner as may
become necessary to avoid undue diversionary impact on scheduled
service."
B. Termination of the Prior Affinity Charter Concept
The introduction of TGC's proved to be only one solution to the
affinity charter problem. In two notices of proposed rule making the
Board announced that it intends to further redesign charter serv-
ices." One of the proposed rules intended to completely terminate
existing prior affinity charter rules by March 31, 1975. In its pro-
posal, the Board offered the same two arguments that led to the
adoption of TGC rules: prior affinity charter rules are discrimina-
tory, and they are difficult to enforce. Since the vast majority of
charter traffic consists of affinity charters (roughly eighty percent
of transatlantic charter passengers in 1973) the Board faces a se-
vere dilemma. The agency wants to discard a product that, on one
hand, is extremely popular with large segments of the public, es-
pecially those who have long been the lawful user of the affinity con-
cept." On the other hand, the affinity concept is unpopular with
those people who do not belong to the right affinity groups. It is
also an unpopular concept among those parties that depend on its
2939 Fed. Reg. 41995 (1974).
30 Id.
'" Supra note 12.
32 Correspondence received by the Board contained 265 pieces from groups
and 13,719 from consumers opposing the termination of affinity charters. Among
the correspondence received from consumers a substantial amount resulted from
campaigns by the British American Club of Northern California, the Continental
Club of Kirkland, Wash., and the Trans-Atlantic Brides and Parents Association.
See Comments of the CAB's Office of the Consumer Advocate on EDR-237C,
No. 24908, at 2-9 (CAB, Dec. 20, 1974).
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enforcement, such as the scheduled airlines, most tour operators,
and travel agents.
If the affinity problem is to be solved in a manner that will satis-
fy all parties concerned, the Congress and the Board have to create
new and workable charter concepts. Congress may take steps in
this direction by considering a Low-Cost Air Transportation Bill
introduced by Senators Cannon and Kennedy." The bill would re-
tain affinity charters until Congress decides that they should be
phased out. At the same time, the bill would authorize one-stop in-
clusive tour charters' and replace Travel Group Charters with sub-
stantially liberalized Advance Booking Charters.'
The Board can make a substantial contribution to solving the
affinity problem by announcing and enacting the new rules in a
well coordinated time-schedule to replace gradually the existing
rules. This is extremely important in the mass tourism industry in
which contractual arrangements are frequently made as far as two
or three years in advance. It is apparent that the phasing out of af-
finity charters has suffered from both a lack of acceptable alterna-
tives and an inadequate timing. The first suspension of affinity char-
ters was announced by the Board in November, 1972 by Advance
Notice of Proposed Rule Making EDR-237. At that time, the Board
had just enacted the TGC whose rules would prove to be "virtually
unmarketable."" As a result the Board had to improve the market-
ability of TGC's, leaving affinity charters intact. The proposed rule
making of October 30, 1974, would terminate the affinity charters
by March 31, 1975." Under the pressure of Congressional action
'IS. 421, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
'Section C infra.
5The proposed ABC's in S. 421 would reduce the advance booking deadline
to one month before departure. Charter organizers would have the risk of unsold
seats so that these can be marketed at a fixed price. In its present form the Bill
allows the charter organizer to sell up to 25 percent of the seats at any time
prior to the departure date. Acceptance of this provision would substantially erode
the advance booking notion. A better solution seems to introduce a no-refund
charge (e.g., 10 or 25 percent of the fare) in case of cancellation. This amount
should (partially) cover the loss from cancelled seats. If the organizer becomes
the risk-taker of the ABC he may also account for some cancellations in advance
and spread their cost over all seats. In this way, it is not necessary to provide
for a cancellation insurance, while the enforcement problem of the 25 percent
last-month-seats is avoided.
"See text accompanying note 24, supra.
7 39 Fed. Reg. 40963 (1974).
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and the many comments filed against the proposed termination, the
Board decided recently that the affinity charters would not be ter-
minated during the year 1975." The CAB once again recognized
that one or more adequate substitute forms of charter have to be
authorized before the affinity charters can be abolished.
C. The One-Stop Inclusive Tour Charter
As mentioned earlier, the Board simultaneously introduced its
proposed termination of affinity charters with a proposal for a new
charter formula, the One-stop Inclusive Tour Charter (OTC)." The
OCT would be, according to the Board, "something of a hybrid"
between the TGC and the Inclusive Tour Charter (ITC).
The ITC is a legislative product of the sixties that has never got-
ten off the ground, despite its "real promise both domestically and
internationally as the instrumentality most likely to accomplish
significant expansion of pleasure air travel. ' '.. ITC flights must be at
least seven days in duration and include three overnight stops at
least fifty miles apart. In addition, the total tour price must not be
less than 110 percent of the lowest scheduled airline fare. Evidence
before the Senate Aviation Subcommittee demonstrates that the
ITC form of travel has failed to fulfill the role envisioned by the
CAB and Congress. Between 1968 and 1972, an annual average
of 630 ITC flights was performed. In 1972, it was estimated that
not more than 160,000 passengers were carried on ITCs. By any
air transport standard, this can only be described as a "drop in the
bucket.""' ITC regulations should carry most of the blame for this
performance.
With the proposed OTC, the Board hopes to overcome the mar-
keting problems inherent in the three-stop requirement of existing
ITC's. The OTC is not, however, merely a liberalized version of the
ITC. It is a new regulatory invention embodying the following re-
strictions:
1. An all-inclusive tour will be offered by a tour operator at a
fixed price which may not be less than the prescribed mini-
mum. The price must include overnight lodging, breakfast
"40 Fed. Reg. 5371 (1975).
"39 Fed. Reg. 39572 (1974).
4 S. REP. No. 387, 93rd Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1973).
41 Id. at 2.
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plus one meal per day, and transfer to and from transporta-
tion terminals.
2. A list of the prospective passengers, including all participants
who have made full payment for the OTC, must be filed with
the CAB no later than thirty days prior to the flight date.
3. The tour must have a minimum duration of seven days in
North American markets (unless the return trip takes place on
Sunday or Monday), and ten days for international OTC's.
4. No substitutions or additions may be made to the list of pas-
sengers after this list has been filed with the Board.
5. For all OTC's other than North American the same minimum
price rules are applicable as with ITCs, i.e., 110 percent of
the scheduled fare. For North American OTC's a minimum
per diem amount of $25 must be added to the pro rata char-
ter price.
6. Each authorized carrier is prohibited from contracting more
than one-fourth of one percent of the number of passengers
carried in the relevant market on domestic scheduled service
during the most recent twelve-month period. The CAB pro-
vides detailed instructions on how this number is accounted
for.
The strongest attack against the Board's proposed OTC comes
from within the regulatory agency itself. The CAB's Office of the
Consumer Advocate has commented as follows:
The Office fully concurs in the Board's basic desire to provide
low-cost vacation package tours on a charter basis which are not
encumbered with a three-stop requirement. The basic thrust which
the Board has taken in the direction of a one-stop inclusive tour
charter (OTC) concept surely will be welcomed by consumers.
Unfortunately, very few consumers will ever be able to make use
of the type of charter program proposed.
Serious internal differences of opinion and purpose seem to have
found their way into the present proposal. As a result, the pro-
posal displays a series of apparent serious imbalances. In the OTC
proposal, as with the Travel Group Charter regulations, the idea
was good; the execution poor.2
Many of the OTC restrictions seem artificial and costly, and ap-
'Comments of the CAB's Office of the Consumer Advocate on EDR-281,
No. 27135, at 1 (CAB, Nov. 27, 1974) (emphasis added).
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pear to create marketing problems similar to those created by the
TGC. The required breakfast and one meal per day are disturbing
limitations on a vacationer's personal freedom. Rail passes or car
rentals may not constitute part of the minimum per diem price be-
cause this might encourage individual travel. The minimum stay
requirement of ten days for international OTC's frustrates efficient
and cost-saving back-to-back operations by air carriers. The seven-
day minimum in North America eliminates OTC's to such short-
stay resorts as Las Vegas, Orlando, and national parks, and to pop-
ular tourist cities such as New York, Washington, and San Fran-
cisco.
The Board's minimum price proposal poses several questions,
aside from the principal objections that can be made against mini-
mum price regulation. The minimum amount of $25 per day does
not account for decreasing costs with a longer stay; the amount is
too high per se for what many segments of the travel industry are
capable and willing to offer. If the minimum price is higher than the
necessary cost to the industry the tour operator will all but start price
competition, which leads to waste and frustration of consumer
choice. In its comments on the OTC, the Justice Department notes
that Las Vegas charters from the east coast contain land packages
for as low as $7 per day. Interference with this "market determined
price would be competitively unwarranted and inflationary."'
The proposed OTC's would be restricted by quotas of one-fourth
of one percent of the scheduled service over the preceding twelve-
month period. Apart from the administrative and enforcement prob-
lems of quotas, the proposed amount (one fourth of one percent)
would preclude any substantial OTC development among U.S.
cities and resorts, sightseeing areas, etc. Furthermore, it is doubtful
that the CAB can legally restrict the volume of scheduled carriers'
on-route charters between points named in the certificates issued
pursuant to Section 401 of the Federal Aviation Act." The sched-
uled carriers derive from their certificates the right to carry all traf-
fic between points named in those certificates. '
"' Comments of the United States Department of Justice on EDR-281, No.
27135, at 13 (CAB, Dec. 30, 1974).
"Cite to Aviation Act § 401.
'See Comments of United Air Lines, Inc., on EDR-281, No. 27135, at 12
(CAB, Dec. 11, 1974).
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Is the OTC formula appropriate as a replacement for the affinity
concept? To answer this question, it is necessary to restate briefly
what the affinity concept has meant to large segments of the public.
Basically, it has been a low-cost, point-to-point form of transporta-
tion, marketed via cost-saving club magazines and word-of-mouth
advertising; its most important feature other than the reduced fare,
is a low "service" level that implies high load factors, infrequent
scheduling, and modest inflight-service. It should be noted that affi-
nity charters neither included advance booking requirements (al-
though in practice most reservations and payments are made several
weeks or months before departure) nor prescribed land arrange-
ments. The OTC and TGC rules have advance booking require-
ments of sixty and thirty days, respectively.
It is presently impossible to say whether the consumer will com-
mit himself more than one or two months in advance in order to
achieve the OTC and TGC savings. The industry simply does not
yet know what the consumer's attitudes are towards advance book-
ing, paying, the risk of cancellation losses, etc.
Although the advance purchase requirement was so easily con-
ceived by regulators and some members of the industry, an adequate
understanding will require time, experimentation, and adequate
marketing." This new aspect of both OTC's and TGC's (combined
with all other new requirements and restrictions) prescribes the
need for experimentation on a more liberalized basis than now pro-
posed by the CAB. An OTC with a fifteen-day instead of thirty
day deadline may seem too "diversionary;" all other restrictions,
however, should preclude "substantial impairment." In that sense,
4 The advance notice of proposed rule making, 36 Fed. Reg. 2514 (1971),
contained a proposal for a "Non-Affinity Charter" that would have enabled any
group of 50 or more persons to form a charter group at least six months prior
to flight departure. Since then a significant part of the diversion debate has focused
on the appropriate lead time. In its TGC rule of Sept. 27, 1972. 37 Fed. Reg.
20808 (1972), the Board reduced the lead time to three months. By mid-1973
it became clear that this period (in addition to other restrictions) was too long
to fit into consumers' commitment patterns. The Board reduced the period to 60
days in its TGC modification regulation of August 12, 1974. 39 Fed. Reg. 29345
(1972) Historians may be interested to know that Member Timm dissented to
the enactment of TGC's by stating: "The risks to the scheduled system are far
beyond the permissible parameters of experimentation. The reduction of the ad-
vance purchase time from six to three months was done with no rational justifica-
tion in the face of factual surveys showing that even six months might be too short
a period." SPR-61 at I (Sept. 27, 1972) (dissenting opinion of Timm).
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to relax the advance booking limit from thirty to fifteen days (or
from sixty to forty-five or thirty days with TGC's) would seem to
be only a marginal liberalization, other restrictions remaining
equal. A great advantage would be created allowing the OTC's and
TGC's to be brought much more in line with the affinity concept
which did not contain any advance booking requirement.
III. CHARTER RATE DISCUSSIONS AND MINIMUM
RATE GUIDELINES
A. Carrier Discussions Fail
Since mid-1973, scheduled and supplemental carriers flying the
North Atlantic have been trying to agree on minimum charter rates.
The first discussions, authorized by the Board on June 19, 1973, re-
sulted only in the conclusion that it would be extremely difficult
to unite the opposed interests of individual carriers and carrier
groups." The Board's approval of the discussion of a minimum level
of rates was based on "the intense and often destructive competi-
tion among charter operators producing a downward spiral of char-
ter rates unrelated to the costs of providing the service."' Another
concern of the Board was, and still is, the high degree of competi-
tion between charter and scheduled services for a significant seg-
ment of the North Atlantic travel market. As is generally known,
the scheduled carriers are forced to establish relatively low discount
fares that have a depressing effect on carrier earnings. Furthermore,
the IATA-fare structure is extremely complex, including a high
"normal" economy fare and several low promotional fares. Of the
latter, the best known is the 22-46 day excursion fare.'
The first discussions among carriers, which broke down in July,
1973, led the Board to "inject an element of stability into the char-
ter rate situation." The agency issued in September, 1973, a notice
of proposed rule making to amend its policy statements, which
would establish minimum rate guidelines for charter service between
4 For the order authorizing rate making discussions, see supra note 8; for a
brief history of the rate making discussions, see Policy Statement on Minimum
Charter Rate Levels, 39 Fed. Reg. 38092 (1974).
" 38 Fed. Reg. 25453 (1973).
"' Round trip economy fares New York-London for 1975 are $584 (winter
season), $626 (shoulder season) and $764 (peak season). The 22-45 day excur-
sion fares are $363, $393, and $493 respectively. The new 22-45 day APEX-fare
amounts to $295 (winter), $309 (shoulder), and $399 (peak season).
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the United States and Europe." The Board hoped, however, that
the carriers would be able to negotiate an acceptable minimum rate
level among themselves.
B. A Government-Imposed Charter Floor
Since September, 1973, fuel shortages and inflation worsened
the problems of carriers. In the minimum rate level discussions, car-
riers reached only a tentative agreement in September, 1974, an
agreement opposed by three U.S. supplementals and two foreign
charter-only carriers." Notwithstanding opposition from several di-
rections, the Board finalized its proposal to establish minimum
charter rate guidelines and adopted a definitive Policy Statement on
October 18, 1974. According to the Statement, the Board would
"evaluate tariff rates against the standards set forth" in its state-
ment." Tariff filings not conforming to these standards must be ac-
companied by a full and adequate justification. The Board's State-
ment subsequently provides the carriers with minimum rates exclu-
sively based on season and aircraft seating capacity.
The objections to the Board's minimum rate level policy can be
categorized. First, there are protests from carriers who question the
specific level of the rates. Supplemental carriers claim that the rates
are too high; scheduled carriers consider the levels too low. Both
groups challenge the specific cost data and methodology used by
the CAB. By entering the area of cost determination, the CAB has
provided ample opportunity for long debates over what reasonable
rates should be. Are seating capacity and seasonal patterns enough
criteria to determine seat-mile costs? What about lower rates for
charters originating in Europe? How should one account for the
difference between an east cost and west cost originating charter?
In what way can a solution be found to the eternal debate between
average or marginal cost pricing?
Secondly, the Board's minimum rate level policy has been ques-
tioned from a legal viewpoint. In Moss v. CAB,"5 an order of the
CAB outlined a fare formula for domestic airlines and permitted tar-
iff filings implementing that formula to be filed without suspension.
5038 Fed. Reg. 25453 (1973).
5' Wall Street Journal, Dec. 19, 1974, at col. 5.
52 39 Fed. Reg. 38092 (1974); see also text, supra notes 9-11.
53430 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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The court held the order to be invalid and tariffs filed by airlines
based thereon were unlawful. The court considered the fare formula
and its application "agency rate making," which, according to sec-
tions 1002(d) and 1002(e) of the Federal Aviation Act,"4 would
require public notice and hearings. With the establishment of char-
ter rate guidelines, the Board comes very close to rate making, and
it is not surprising that the Policy Statement has been challenged.
A recent motion by the Department of Justice for stay and peti-
tion for reconsideration of the Board's Policy Statement was denied.
The CAB took the view that its action was not illegal and stated
that its policy provides no more than "specific guidelines for the
purpose of evaluating existing and proposed charter rates."' The
Board further clarified its policy by saying:
Stated differently, by establishing guidelines, the Board has merely
made it known that it does not intend to review rates which are
filed above that level. Conversely, rates filed below that level will be
scrutinized both against industry data and that provided in the par-
ticular carrier's justification. It is, of course, patent that the Board
has authority to suspend and investigate any North Atlantic char-
ter rate it deems unreasonable under the usual statutory and evi-
dentiary criteria, whether Policy Statement guidelines exist or not.
No rights of any person are affected by the promulgation of the
Policy Statement and, as its terms indicate, the guideline rates are
not in any sense "legally prescribed" so as to require the proce-
dural steps incidental to Board "prescribed" rates for domestic air
transportation service. The provisions of section 1002(j) clearly
do not grant the Board prescription power over the reasonableness
of rates in foreign air transporation, and the Board has not sought
to exercise such power in promulgating the Statement."
As expected, the Justice Department and several other groups
(supplemental carriers, tour operators and the Aviation Consumer
Action Project) filed a petition for review of the Board's Policy
Statement in the U.S. Court of Appeals in Washington, D.C.' After
the court had stayed application of the guidelines, the Board vacat-
ed its Policy Statement in February, 1975. The Board said that it
"Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1002(d), (e) (1970).
"39 Fed. Reg. 43575 (1974).
56 Id.
"' Pillai, Government Regulation in the Private Interest, 40 J. Am L. & COM.
29, 42-48 (1974).
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could not implement the guidelines for the 1975 season since most
charter contracts for the season had already been concluded and
that interference with these contracts at a time so close to the sea-
son would cause undue interruption." The Board indicated, how-
ever, that the possibility of charter rate minima should be further
explored and that it may take steps to this end again in the future."
C. A Future Charter Floor Ought to be Avoided
In its original statement to implement its guidelines the Board
recognizes that it has historically limited its intervention in the rate
regulation area in order to develop charter services. In this manner
the public could be served at prices set in the competitive market
place. However, as the CAB sees it:
[W]ith the sharp recent increases in operating costs, due in part to
fuel and other inflationary cost forces, this approach is no longer
viable and a more detailed regulatory environment appears war-
ranted, at least for a temporary period."
It is regrettable that the Board does not elaborate on why fare set-
ting in the free market place is "no longer viable," although it does
summarily refer to escalating fuel costs, inflation, organized compe-
tition with scheduled services, and the proposition of European avi-
ation agencies to establish minimum charter rates. Most of the
Board's explanation is devoted to the methodology in setting the
minimum level, an issue that guarantees disagreements among air-
lines. Since the Board and several ECAC members still seem to be
alarmed by the absence of a charter price floor, it seems appropriate
to warn against the consequences of such a price floor."
First, one of the few competitive instruments in North Atlantic
air transport would be removed. Charter rate discussions and man-
datory or near-mandatory minimum levels would lead to a further
cartellization of an industry that provides a relative luxury, i.e., rec-
reational long distance travel. As long as this product is voluntarily
51 CAB Press Release 75-34 (Feb. 11, 1975).
"Id.
6°39 Fed. Reg. 43575 (1974).
' ECAC countries recently urged the CAB for "an internationally acceptable
relationship between scheduled fares and charter prices." To establish this, ECAC
wants "application of charter price control surveillance on both sides of the
Atlantic." See ECAC Calls Meeting on North Atlantic Charter Floor, Travel
Agent, March 10, 1975, at 1.
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offered by so many industry members while others are anxiously
looking for entry (e.g., Laker's skytrain proposal and other appli-
cants in the current Transatlantic Route Proceeding) there is no
need to "protect" the industry and the public against price wars or
service deterioration.
Some governments and most members of the scheduled industry
will argue that the open charter rate situation will lead to wasteful
competition, public subsidization, or bankruptcies. The answer to
this should be found-aside from the application of economic ef-
ficiency criteria- in the nature of the product that is being offered.
Charter travel is, as mentioned before, a relative luxury for the
consumer; it is not a utility or a basic consumer need for which
government interference may be required to take advantage of a
natural monopoly situation or to protect the public against industry
abuses. Furthermore, charter travel is a product that is still rela-
tively new and untested in the market place. Consumers' desires
may change over time; new untapped markets may be disclosed.
Individual members of the industry should have the opportunity to
respond to the challenges of a relatively unknown market. If price
is clearly the instrument that will allow this response in the case of
charters, it should not be set aside by the government or a charter
cartel.
It is unavoidable to associate minimum charter rates with the
arrival of a new sort of IATA for charter services. IATA's worth
is disputed, notwithstanding its many positive contributions to the
development of a sound international scheduled system. " The or-
ganization has achieved a workable international environment and,
therefore, is essential to international aviation. IATA's accomplish-
ments are achieved, however, at a cost; price competition is totally
absent and there is too much "service competition." The latter has
contributed substantially to the excess costs of over-capacity, fancy
in-flight service, too many retail outlets, etc. Charters have ac-
counted for most of the upheavals within the IATA rate making
machinery. The threat of charter fares led to the introduction of
IATA group fares in 1962 and 1966. These fares were a failure;
the answer that would have a significant impact came with the in-
2See generally, M. STRASZHEIM, THE INTERNATIONAL AIRLINE INDUSTRY
(1969); and PILLAI, THE AIR NET-THE CASE AGAINST THE WORLD AVIATION
CARTEL (1969).
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troduction of low promotional excursion fares in 1969 and 1971."
Recently, the introduction of the advance purchase charters (TGC
and ABC) provoked the debate within IATA to counteract with
the APEX fare. This fare is now the lowest IATA fare available to
passengers who do not want to use charter services. If the future
stimulus of competitive charter fares is eliminated, the chances are
greatly decreased that IATA would feel the need to be on the alert.
There are good reasons for supporting the scheduled services of
IATA because a "collective demand" exists for these services."
This demand arises from the desire of a community to have a cer-
tain minimum amount of service. If a collective demand is recog-
nized, the required protection can and should be provided by di-
rect government subsidy rather than by entry restriction and inter-
nal subsidization. If the protection of scheduled services has to be
extended by setting minimum charter rates to keep scheduled rates
high enough, a serious question also rises as to who receives the
benefits and who carries the losses caused by the interference with
spontaneous market forces. Consumers will be turned away because
the price is kept above the level of what they are willing or able to
pay. Some suppliers of charter services will survive in a market in
which they should disappear.
In the area of protected scheduled service, the service may be
maintained at costs that would not be acceptable economically and
politically if properly determined and published. To cope with this
problem, both governments and scheduled airlines need to acquire a
flexible attitude and a willingness to change service levels if circum-
stances change. To undergo these mental changes should not be im-
possible although it may be more difficult for scheduled industry
members who acquire "service myopia" and for government officials
who do not have the resources, expertise, or political courage to an-
ticipate changes in collective demand over the years.
IV. THE CASE FOR CONTROLLED EXPERIMENTATION
WITH LIBERALIZATION
What conclusions should be drawn from the foregoing discus-
"a Keyes, supra note 14, at 227-31; see also Pillai, Government Regulation in
the Private Interest, 40 J. AIR L. & CoM. 29, 42-48 (1974).
" The term "collective demand" is used in: British Air Transport in the Sev-
enties, at 57 (1969).
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sion? All-party satisfying solutions must be excluded because of the
opposing views and interests of different interest groups. To make
things worse, there is even significant disagreement among mem-
bers of the same trade group, be they scheduled or charter carriers
as well as among members of the executive branch." The general
public, for its part, seems to find the matter too complex to fol-
low and, not surprisingly, is apathetic towards a relatively luxury
industry such as air transport. Proposals from members of Congress
have to compete with more urgent economic and political matters
and may therefore meet unavoidable delays. The absence of consen-
sus within the industry carries with it the eventual danger of more
government intervention or a prolonged state of general inconclu-
siveness. If no consensus is achieved, political compromises may be
sought resulting in a lack of creativity and solutions that do not suit
any of the parties involved.
A. The Air Transport Industry Has Matured But Its Products Are
Young and Alive
Post-war economic and technological progress has basically al-
tered the regulatory environment for air transport. In the thirties
and forties, a young and inexperienced industry apparently had to
be "put in order." The airline industry of the seventies, however, is
reaching the first signs of maturity, characterized by reduced growth
and increased concentration. At such a stage in the industry life
cycle, products and prices can be and should be differentiated ac-
cording to the needs of consumers and the opportunities offered by
the producers. The regulator should stimulate competition and
should not restrain the potential differentiation of products and
prices.
In this article a case is made for a controlled experimentation of
new and relatively liberal charter services. Concerted or overt dis-
61 E.g., Pan Am opposes minimum charter rate guidelines on the grounds that
flights with aircraft of less than 230 seats have a minimum per seat mile level that
is almost 25 per cent higher than for flights with aircraft of more than 229 seats.
This gives a competitive advantage to carriers that operate stretched DC-8 air-
craft, primarily the supplementals. Pan Am's charter operations are virtually all
in B-707 aircraft. See for Pan Am's remarks to remove "The Threat of Restraint
of Price Competition," Comments of Pan American World Airways, Inc. on
EDR-237C and EDR-281, Nos. 27135 and 24908 (CAB, _)..
As far as departments of government are concerned, the Department of Trans-
portation encouraged minimum rate discussion and guidelines; the Department of
Justice clearly did not.
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cussions of charter rates and the setting of minimum levels by gov-
ernments are condemned. With respect to the creation of new char-
ter concepts, the marketplace should have a chance to reflect over
time the more significant changes that have occurred-the trend
from business to non-business travel, the introduction of larger air-
craft, the willingness of producers and consumers to offer and de-
mand low-fare/low-service air travel. With respect to tourism, a
sharply decreased role for the "transportation function" should be
realized. In the travel trade, it is the destination that is sold, i.e., the
beach, the resort, or the sightseeing place. The destination combin-
ed with hotels, car rental, and other amenities determines the cost
and value to the consumer. In this conceptual product, air transport
fulfills a role of minor importance both psychologically and eco-
nomically. It will be difficult, but essential, for management of
scheduled airlines which are accustomed to catering to business
travelers, to adjust to this phenomenon.
B. Experimentation Can Be Stimulated By the Regulator
"Controlled" experiments in liberalization of regulations are ad-
visable for several reasons. The air transport industry is regulated
by necessity; complete deregulation seems neither economically de-
sirable nor politically obtainable."' The argument for more charter
experimentation rests on the relatively new premise that the regula-
tor is capable of backwards intervention in case the experiment gets
out of control."' For example, if the TGC or ABC is offered success-
fully to the public on a thirty-day advance booking basis and it can
be demonstrated that serious diversion from scheduled traffic oc-
curs, the regulator should consider establishing a forty-five or sixty
day advance booking minimum. The recent TGC experience and
OTC proposal leave the impression that the CAB follows the oppo-
site policy and wants to relax its charter rules only if they have been
proven unrealistic and unworkable.
6 Pillai, supra note 47, at 49-50.
67 See, e.g., Statement of Robert H. Binder, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Policy, Plans, and International Affairs, Department of Transportation, Hearings
on S. 455 and S. 1739 (Inclusive Tour Charter Transportation), 93rd Cong., 1st
Sess. 137 (1973): "This program of liberalizing inclusive tour charter travel in
a controlled way with immediate experimental application, should provide the
necessary factual basis and experience upon which the further development of
U.S. domestic charter travel can be undertaken at minimum risk of impairing
vital scheduled services."
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One may object to a liberal and experimental manner of regula-
tion because it would create additional and costly regulatory pro-
ceedings and, more important, because charter liberalization in-
creases the probability of significant deterioration of the scheduled
system. As far as additional regulatory proceedings are concerned,
the additional costs may be offset by the gains to the industry and
the public. Regulated industries generally show inflexibilities in the
marketplace with lags in price changes, product development, and
the foreclosure of entry opportunities; the regulated firms are not
free to implement innovations, test the market, or otherwise experi-
ment with consumer demand. As a result, the regulatory agency
should take more responsibility for experimentation and testmarket-
ing, functions that are common practice in today's economy, notably
within larger firms operating in popular consumer markets.
The case against experimentation with liberal formulas for the
sake of scheduled services protection goes back to an old theme and
does not have to be repeated here. This article has tried to indicate
that air travel for business purposes may have peaked while travel
for personal and vacation purposes is still on the rise. Travel for
non-business purposes is highly cost oriented and less service orient-
ed; in a trade-off between a relatively high scheduled fare with low
load factors and high scheduling frequency, versus a low price/
service combination, the vacation-minded customer will probably
choose the latter. He is willing to accept a low price combined with
high load factors and some inconvenience in departure and arrival
times. In short, the vacationing consumer is not willing to pay for
high frequencies with relatively low load factors.
It is useful to mention that the common carrier principle-and
its regulation resulting in service competition-have been designed
and developed in a period when air transport served mainly busi-
ness purposes with a keen awareness for national and regional eco-
nomic development. For the time being, this era seems to have come
to a standstill. In addition, new and cheaper ways of communication
(for example, the vastly improved transatlantic telephone and telex
service) will make further inroads on air travel for business pur-
poses.
The holiday or personal market seems less saturated. Sunshine
or sightseeing cannot be technologically transferred, at least not in
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a satisfactory way. Moreover, improved communication by televi-
sion and movies stimulates a desire to travel instead of reducing it.
Visits to relatives or friends will become more and more a common
good, easy to delay or postpone in times of economic hardship, but
irreplaceable from a social and technological viewpoint. If these
developments lead to an increased demand for charter-like opera-
tions, the airline industry as a whole should be responsive.
C. The Protection of the, Scheduled Industry
A few comments can be made that may ease the fear that the
"scheduled system" (and its carriers) may be seriously impaired.
With new charter opportunities, the market should not be exclu-
sively reserved for supplemental or charter-only carriers. Scheduled
airlines can and should enter the new charter markets, thereby re-
lying on their brand names and familiarity with the public." During
the TGC rule making procedure, diversion estimates were presented
that did not take into account the fact that scheduled airlines may
provide the new service themselves."' The proposed OTC seems to
be an excellent opportunity for scheduled carriers and it will enable
regulator and industry members to determine the importance of a
long-time reputation for safety and dependability. This is not so
obvious for the supplemental carriers who have always operated in
the dark under the flag of tour operators that have generally only
local exposure.
In the international arena, it should be recognized that scheduled
and non-scheduled carriers are competing for the same traffic. Since
non-scheduled carriers compete wit hscheduled services on in-route
markets, it can be argued that scheduled carriers should have com-
petitive opportunities in the off-route markets. This subject is ready
for multilateral or bilateral discussion between those countries that
61 It should be noted that United Airlines flew 53.2% of the total passengers
carried on the domestic civilian charters of the U.S. trunk carriers during 1972,
1973 and through the month of September, 1974. The airline claims to be
a leader among the the scheduled airlines in developing and serving the market for
charter transportation. Comments of United Air Lines, Inc. on EDR-281, No.
27135, at 3 (CAB, Dec. 11, 1974).
"National Economic Research Associates, Inc., Report on the Impact of
Proposed Non-Affinity Charters on Scheduled Service (May, 1971); National Eco-
nomic Research Associates, Inc., Report on the Impact of Proposed Travel Group
Charters on Scheduled Service in the U.S. Domestic Air Passenger Market (Feb.
1972). Both reports were submitted in No. 23055 (CAB, _).
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have developed substantial charter traffic. Presently, the United
States has opted to negotiate charter agreements at a bilateral level
to fill the non-scheduled holes that are the legacy of the Chicago
Convention. 0
It will be difficult, however, to separate the charter negotiations
from existing bilaterals that deal with scheduled services. One so-
lution to define the carriers' roles would be to let carriers specialize
in catering to business travelers, vacation travelers, or group trav-
elers. These specializations can be based on the definition of holi-
day routes and non-holiday routes, or on a distinction between high-
ly developed, semi-developed, or undeveloped routes. In such a re-
alignment of routes and roles of carriers, the scheduled carriers
should approach the diversion or impairment problem with less vi-
gor than in the past. Government and airlines could begin with es-
tablishing routes that require "essential scheduled services" (ES-
routes). The ES-routes may have to be guaranteed by direct govern-
ment subsidies, or, less preferably, by pooling agreements or by im-
posing entry restrictions and limitations on charter traffic. Routes
that do not have an ES-status should have a chance to receive a wide
variety of services: supersonic, scheduled, charter, skybus, shuttle.
In determining the competitive roles between scheduled and non-
scheduled carriers, the parties may provide a sort of grandfather
right to the scheduled carriers granting them priority to receive
route authority to provide a sufficient number of service/price var-
iations. Additional carriers should be allowed to enter the market
in case the existing array of services is unsatisfactory. Since the car-
riers would be allowed to provide the variety of services that
they consider most profitable, the distinctions between scheduled
and non-scheduled carriers would disappear, at least on the routes
that do not have ES-status. ES-routes would be reserved for sched-
uled carriers under limited protected conditions.
PUBLIC AIR LAW IN TRANSITION
With proposals to liberalize charter regulations and to review the
present scheduled-non-scheduled system of air transport, avia-
tion law will undergo dramatic changes. Practitioners and students
of international aviation policy formerly focused on the interpreta-
'°Supra note 15.
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tion of the Chicago Convention and the application of Bermuda
principles. In the field of economic regulation, entry and rate of re-
turn criteria received considerable attention. During the second half
of the seventies, law and policymakers should be highly sensitive to
the developments in the marketplace. More than ever, the regulator
and aviation lawyer should be concerned with the impact of new
laws or regulations on all interest groups, i.e., on the individual car-
riers, the industry as a whole, and, last but not least, the different
segments of the public.
In generating new charter concepts, it is essential to have an
understanding of consumer behavior, marketing opportunities and
limitations, and an ability to anticipate industry reactions to new
concepts. The days are over in which adequate aviation regulation
is in the public interest if merely a certain philosophy is followed or
regulators give in to political compromise. The characteristics and
desires of the marketplace must have a chance to manifest them-
selves in rule making procedures and regulatory creations, especial-
ly when legal definitions of new products such as charters are at
stake.

